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This paper investigates the effect of the 2009 guidance of the Department for Environ-
ment, Food & Rural Affairs on greenhouse gas (GHG) disclosure. The sample comprises 215
companies from a population of London Stock Exchange FTSE 350 companies over four
years (2008e2011). To quantify GHG disclosure, a research index methodology is
employed, with information derived from several GHG reporting frameworks. The
econometric model is estimated using panel ﬁxed effects. Our ﬁndings suggest that the
publication of the 2009 guidance has had a signiﬁcant effect on the level of GHG disclo-
sure, and that corporate governance mechanisms (board size, director ownership, and
ownership concentration) also affect the extent of GHG information disclosure. The results
also indicate that companies increased their disclosures prior to the 2009 guidance in
anticipation of its publication. These results have important implications for the govern-
ment, suggesting that non-mandatory guidance could increase disclosure as much as do
mandatory requirements.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
A growing wave of scientiﬁc evidence relating to global warming has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced policy makers to take
decisive steps towards managing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g. Boston & Lempp, 2011; Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2001, 2007; Jones et al., 1988; Karl et al., 1991). Responding to this emerging threat, the United Kingdom (UK)
government introduced a set of initiatives known as the Climate Change Programme (Wordsworth & Grubb, 2001). In part,
these initiatives led to the enactment of the Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008. Among other things, the CCA (2008) recognises
that measuring and reporting GHG emissions is critical to the ﬁght against global emissions, with Section 83 requiring the
government to issue guidance on this.1 The UK government e through the Department for Environment, Food& Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) e therefore issued guidance on GHG emissions measurement and reporting in September 2009.
The main aim of the 2009 guidance,2 which was voluntary, was to support UK organisations in reducing their contribution
to climate change. Modelled on the GHG Protocol (2004), the guidance outlined the measurement and reporting criteria for, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Fern Barrow, Poole, Dorset, BH12 5BB, UK.
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Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14064-1, a speciﬁc standard that details accounting and reporting for GHG emissions.
Although other GHG reporting guidance (e.g. GHG Protocol, 2004; Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure; Carbon
Disclosure Project, 2011; Carbon Disclosure Standard Board; Global Reporting Initiative; ISO 14064-1) already existed, the
publication of the government-backed DEFRA guidance in 2009 brought momentum and policy clarity to UK companies. This
suggestion is consistent with Bowen and Wittneben (2011), who argued that while businesses can measure and report
emissions voluntarily, government-backed initiatives such as regulation provide a reasonable basis upon which ﬁrms can
justify investments in new technologies and other green energy initiatives.
The publication of the DEFRA guidance towards the end of 2009, however, meant that companies wishing to report in
accordance with the guidance would have done so for the ﬁrst time in 2010.3 Notwithstanding this, it is anticipated that the
effect of the DEFRA guidance could also be seen in the period immediately prior to its publication, since ﬁrms might have
wished to disclose more GHG information in anticipation of the guidance. This is because the CCA (2008), signalling the
issuance of the guidance, may have inﬂuenced ﬁrms to increase their disclosures as a way of pre-empting the guidance
requirements. In essence, the staggered approach taken to the introduction of the guidance (i.e. beginningwith the CCA, 2008
and then consultations) meant that companies had time to begin experimenting with the disclosure requirements.
In this paper, we investigate whether ﬁrms have responded positively to the 2009 DEFRA guidance by disclosing signif-
icantly more GHG information over a four-year period (i.e. 2008e2011), with a particular focus on whether more disclosures
were made in the two-year period after the issuance of the guidance (2010 and 2011) compared to the two-year period before
it (2008 and 2009)e and, if so, whether the voluntary reporting policy architecture adequately enables policymakers to bring
about their desired outcome. Evidence of the efﬁcacy of voluntary guidance in inﬂuencing disclosure behaviour is important
because proponents of regulation argue that without it, organisations lack incentives to voluntarily disclose adequate in-
formation; opponents, meanwhile, assert that it is only through market forces that optimal disclosure levels are achieved
(Gore, 2004). Investigation of the effect of the 2009 DEFRA guidance is also important since its issuance by the government
appears to be an exception rather than the norm. This is on the basis that the regulatory regime governing information
disclosure in the UK has followed the English law tradition that only principles are laid down and the rest is supplemented by
managerial discretion (Arnold &Matthews, 2002). The 2009 guidance is an exception in that it gives a detailed account (and
even illustrations) of how companies shouldmeasure and disclose GHG emissions.4 Thus, the ﬁndings of how this exceptional
2009 DEFRA guidance is observed by companies on a voluntary basis may inﬂuence government policy in future on whether
to issue mandatory requirements or guidance on important disclosure issues.
The study also seeks to establish whether GHG disclosure is determined by corporate governance mechanisms, controlling
for company-speciﬁc characteristics. This is in part motivated by the 2009 DEFRA guidance requiring that once GHG are
measured and disclosed, the organisation should analyse its carbon emissions, the disclosure actions it will take to reduce
emissions, and the corporate governance structures in place to manage these. The suggestion that corporate governance
structures should be in place to manage GHG emissions implies that such structures may also inﬂuence disclosure of GHG
information.
Despite the burgeoning research on climate change and GHG disclosure (e.g. Ascui, 2014; Berthelot & Robert, 2012;
Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008; Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2014; Milne & Grubnic, 2011; Peters & Romi, 2012;
Prado-Lorenzo, Rodriguez-Dominguez, Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009; Rankin, Windsor, & Wahyum, 2011;
Stanny, 2011), there is still a paucity of studies focussing on the role of corporate governance in GHG emission disclosures.
Furthermore, Milne and Grubnic (2011) made an urgent call for research that looks at a diverse range of climate change
accounting, including disclosure. A similar call was made by Ascui (2014), who notes that the social and environmental
accounting ﬁeld has insufﬁciently addressed most areas of carbon accounting, of which GHG disclosure is one part. Therefore,
this study also partly responds to those calls. Following prior studies in particular, that by Kock, Santalo, and Diestre (2012) e
we use stakeholder-agency theory, as developed by Hill and Jones (1992), to help explain how corporate governance helps to
align managerial and stakeholder interests regarding GHG emission disclosure. This theoretical paradigm, which extends the
boundaries of principal e agent relationships as envisaged by agency theory, helps to highlight or justify the extension of the
ﬁduciary duties of the board of directors to cover stakeholders other than shareholders (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Kock
et al., 2012).
Our results indicate an increasing trend in GHG disclosures from 2008 to 2011, but a particularly signiﬁcant increase is
evident between 2009 and 2010, implying that the issuance of DEFRA guidance in 2009 on how to measure and report GHG
emissions had a positive effect on GHG disclosure. The increase in GHG disclosure between 2008 and 2009, prior to issuance
of the DEFRA guidance, could be attributed to ﬁrms' anticipation of the issuance of the guidance through the CCA (2008) and3 This is due to the specialised nature of GHG emissions, which requires investment in systems and personnel in order to collect, measure, and report
such information (see Kolk et al., 2008); therefore, such investment would take time.
4 Under the DEFRA guidance (2009), ﬁrms are encouraged to calculate emissions from activities they control (both direct and indirect carbon footprints),
then to categorise them into three ‘scopes’ (with measurement determined by multiplying activity data by emission factors provided by the authorities),
and ﬁnally to disclose total emissions (expressed in CO2e tonnes) and the measurement criteria/standard used. The organisation then carries out a strategic
analysis of its carbon emissions, and discloses actions taken to reduce them and corporate governance processes introduced to manage them, including the
opportunities available (e.g. emissions trading schemes). Finally, the guidelines call for disclosure of carbon-related risks e both physical (e.g. the impact of
climate change on company operations) and regulatory (e.g. the potential effect of carbon regulation on company operations).
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ownership concentration) and company-speciﬁc control variables (size, gearing, ﬁnancial slack and industry) have a signif-
icant effect on GHG disclosure.
The research makes the following contributions to the disclosure literature. First, the study provides evidence of the effect
of the government-backed 2009 DEFRA guidance on GHG reporting. The evidence of the effect of this guidance is important
since the existing literature argues that voluntary disclosure often indicates the extent to which mandatory guidelines may
enforce compliance (Hess, 2008). This is especially important given that GHG reporting became mandatory for all London
Stock Exchange-listed companies for reporting years ending on or after 30th September 2013. As one of the policy in-
struments intended to help the UK achieve its emission targets, our review of its effect also contributes toMilne and Grubnic's
(2011, p. 951) argument that the slowdown in achieving meaningful progress in attaining some international commitment
targets such as Kyoto is perhaps in part due to ‘continuation of relatively weak policy regimes’ in this area. Our ﬁnding that
government-backed guidance produced positive resultsmight strengthen the need for ﬁrm government intervention in those
other initiatives, which are largely voluntary.
Second, our study contributes to the understanding of the extent of GHG voluntary disclosure practices by UK ﬁrms in the
context of the requirements of a number of pieces of GHG disclosure guidance. A broader but GHG-focused and inclusive
index enables us capture the effect of the 2009 DEFRA guidance prior to its issuance, since it is not speciﬁc to this guidance. In
contrast with the GHG disclosure indexes used by most extant research (e.g. Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Liao et al., 2014; Peters
& Romi, 2012; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny, 2011) which are mostly based on only one set of GHG disclosure guidance e i.e. the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006) e or on Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) disclosures, our GHG disclosure draws on a
number of guidance documents such as the GHG Protocol (2004), Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure (2006), ISO
14064-1 (2006), and DEFRA (2009). The use of a single and generic environmental disclosure guidance such as GRI (2006) to
measure a speciﬁc issue, e.g. GHG disclosure, has come under criticism (see Day&Woodward, 2009; Rankin et al., 2011), who
regard it as being too broad yet too limited to help adequately in quantifying GHG disclosures. On the other hand, the reliance
on CDP data has also come under scrutiny, with the reliability of such data being questioned since ﬁrms tend not to disclose
their information related speciﬁcally to climate change (Kolk et al., 2008). Moreover, in the earlier period of the questionnaire
(i.e. 2003e2005), there were inconsistent questions, which makes comparison difﬁcult.
Third, our focus on companies from a diverse range of industries sets this study apart from prior GHG disclosure studies,
which have tended to focus predominantly on the so-called ‘environmentally sensitive’ industries. A wide focus, such as that
adopted here, enhances the understanding of the subject matter (De Villiers, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2011). Finally, our study
also contributes by providing evidence of the role of corporate governance and company-speciﬁc control variables on GHG
disclosure in the UK, where there is limited empirical evidence (Liao et al., 2014).
The paper is structured as follows e Section 2 presents the literature review and hypotheses development; and Section 3
describes the research design. Empirical results of the research are then discussed in Section 4, while the summary and
conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1. Theoretical framework
Existing research has used agency, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories (Berthelot & Robert, 2012; Freedman & Jaggi,
2005; Llena, Moneva, & Hernandez, 2007; Stanny & Ely, 2008) to explain the rationale behind environmental (including
GHG) disclosure. Deegan (2002) argued that often there is an overlap between the various theories explaining disclosure, and
so it is not uncommon to use more than one theory. Following the work of Hill and Jones (1992), and in particular Kock et al.
(2012), we use the stakeholder-agency theory paradigm to analyse the effect of governance and other external control
mechanisms, such as government-initiated reporting guidance (e.g. DEFRA, 2009), in inﬂuencing ﬁrms to report GHG
emissions.
Stakeholder-agency theory presents a ﬁrm as a nexus of contracts between resource holders and seekers (Hill & Jones,
1992). Thus, beyond the agency theory arguments, this paradigm argues that in a modern day ﬁrm, managers are deemed
to have an implicit relationship with not only shareholders but also other stakeholders (Blair, 1998; Kock et al., 2012). De
Villiers and Van Staden (2011a) explained that managers' reporting of environmental information is thus targeted not only
at shareholders but also at other non-capital market stakeholders. What makes managers duty-bound to explain themselves
to these stakeholders through disclosure is the need to have continued access to critical resources that might be controlled by
the latter (Hill & Jones, 1992). It is this mutual resource dependency that gives stakeholders other than shareholders a
legitimate claim on a ﬁrm's allocation of resources, including those related to voluntary disclosure (De Villiers et al., 2011;
Kock et al., 2012). Therefore, within the stakeholder-agency framework, the principaleagent relationship is extended to
mean a relationship that exists between a manager and stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992; Kock et al., 2012).
Just as in agency theory, however, the principaleagent relationship envisaged in the stakeholdereagency relationship is
riddled with a conﬂict of interests regarding how the ﬁrm's resources are allocated. Kock et al. (2012) argued that man-
agement and stakeholder interests may diverge, in particular regarding environmental issues, with stakeholders showing a
greater preference for environmental issues than managers. In fact, there is a growing number of studies that have docu-
mented evidence of various stakeholders pressurising a ﬁrm to be environmentally friendly (Bansal, 2005; Darnall,
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interests regarding environmental issues have emerged. First, this divergence is caused by the nature of the investment
required in environmental initiatives, which is often signiﬁcant in the short term but has long-term returns in most cases
(Darnall et al., 2010; King & Lenox, 2002; Marcus & Fremeth, 2009). It is this long-term nature that conﬂicts with managers'
interests, which inmost cases have a short-term horizon often tied to or mirrored in their employment contracts. Second, it is
believed that other than shareholders, stakeholders have no direct vested interest in ﬁnancial returns; hence, their pressure
for more environmental initiatives will not be hindered by considerations relating to the impact of environmental initiatives
on the ﬁrm's margin (Kock et al., 2012). Nonetheless, existing evidence showing the positive impact of environmental per-
formance on a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance may help align managerial and stakeholder interests regarding environmental
and climate change initiatives, but perhaps only to a certain level. Generally, it is expected that a strong preference for
environmental or green initiatives exhibited by other stakeholders would stretch to the point at which environmental
performance brings positive returns to ﬁnancial performance and pushes a ﬁrm towards the negative zone, and managers
would strive to resist that (Kock et al., 2012).
In addition, it is not only the desire to limit the negative impact of environmental initiatives on ﬁnancial performance that
makes managers resist environmental initiatives. Apart from the substantial investment needed in the complex redesign of a
ﬁrm's internal processes and the development of green competencies (King & Lenox, 2002; Marcus & Fremeth, 2009), it also
requires managers to invest signiﬁcant time in thinking about and planning the systems. Nonetheless, Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia (2009) stated that managerial efforts in this respect are often unobservable and non-veriﬁable; hence, they may not be
rewarded through existing compensation schemes. Therefore, as argued by Kock et al. (2012), this leads management to have
a different utility function from other stakeholders. The anonymity of the managerial effort could potentially create an in-
formation asymmetry problem, leading to managers not being rewarded for these efforts, as most of their compensation
relates to ﬁnancial performance.
Prior evidence indicates that managers prefer ﬁnancial growth-related projects, as these are often linked to their
compensation, job status, and security (Hill& Jones,1992), and that in certain cases they do delay investments in research and
development with long-term beneﬁts that will be realised after their contracts have expired. In these circumstances, the
principals (stakeholders) face a situation where the agent might begin to act in conﬂict with their interest due to the in-
formation asymmetry problem if the latter is inadequately motivated. Therefore, this phenomenon creates the need to
develop mechanisms to monitor managerial interests and to align them with those of other stakeholders regarding envi-
ronmental or GHG emission issues. Kock et al. (2012) suggested that within the framework of stakeholder-agency theory,
mechanisms to monitor and align managerial interests could be achieved through external means (such as stakeholder
pressure through government regulation/guidance) and internal mechanisms (such as corporate governance).
Arguably, external control mechanisms could help align the interests of managers with those of other stakeholders
regarding GHG emission-related issues. Kock et al. (2012) argued that government regulation or guidance provides a legit-
imate basis for other stakeholders to impose their wishes on management. More importantly for managerial decision-
making, government guidance potentially creates a decision-making dilemma. First, De Villiers and Van Staden (2011a)
explained that the availability of such guidance, or of various voluntary reporting regimes such as those on GHG emis-
sions, provides a compliance platform that symbolises a ﬁrm's environmental efforts. Second, Kock et al. (2012) reasoned that
the existence of such reporting frameworks signiﬁcantly increases the chances of managers being held personally responsible
or accountable for any environmental misbehaviour if compliance is enforced. Support for regulation also rests on the
premise that ‘regulation of reporting reduces accounting choice; leads to more consistent and comparable reporting; and
thereby reduces information asymmetry’ (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011b, p. 319).
In this respect, there is growing evidence that faced with such situations, managers or ﬁrms strive to stay ahead of the
game by disclosing information in advance when a regulation or a move towards compulsory regimes is signalled by the
authorities. De Villiers and Van Staden (2011a) argued that government intervention through various types of legislation also
adds momentum to a ﬁrm's adoption of voluntary initiatives relating to good management of the environment, citing the
introduction of the Energy Policy Act 2005 in the USA, which gave many companies the incentive to adopt proactive policies
on the environment. More important to the UK setting is the ﬁnding by De Villiers and Van Staden (2011b) that in the UK
almost 50% of shareholders supported a move towards prescribed regulation on environmental information disclosure.
Rankin et al. (2011) attributed the increase in GHG disclosures by Australian ﬁrms over time to public and policy pressure.
Other voluntary disclosures have also demonstrated an increasing trend as a result of public policy pressure (Guthrie &
Parker, 1989) and community concerns (Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2000). Inchausti (1997) found that in Spain, legislation
e even before becoming compulsorye had a strong bearing on the voluntary accounting disclosures made by companies. It is
in this context that the effect of the issuance of the 2009 DEFRA guidance on GHG disclosure is investigated in this paper.
Corporate governance is considered an effective internal mechanism to help align and monitor managerial interests.
Corporate governance is regarded as ‘the determination of the broad uses towhich organisational resources are displayed and
various stakeholder conﬂicts are resolved’ (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003, p. 371). Kolk and Pinkse (2010) argued that this
inclination signiﬁes rather a departure from thewidely held view of governance as comprising resolutions and being simply a
tool to bridge managerial and shareholder interests. Milnes (2009) and Deloitte (2011) both argued that liberation of the
governance sphere beyond the traditional role means that other concepts, such as corporate social responsibility and envi-
ronmental management, are now within the remit of board responsibilities.
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company and its stakeholders, and that it is the outcome of these relationships that determines strategic direction and ﬁrm
performance. Rodrigue, Magnan, and Cho (2013) explained that since the board of directors is responsible for a ﬁrm's
governance, the directors are responsible for formulating policies relating to environmental issues. Wang and Dewhirst
(1992) noted that directors were becoming increasingly aware of their role in relation to multiple stakeholders. Rossouw
(2005) stated that taking responsibility for ﬁrms' impact on societies and their stakeholders is a governance requirement
from the stakeholder perspective. Indeed, according to Hill and Jones' (1992) proposition of stakeholder-agency theory, the
board of directors is tasked to control an organisation's sustainable behaviour and to ensure that the ﬁrm is accountable to
various stakeholders (see Brennan & Solomon, 2008, for further discussion on this).
In this case, it is expected that boardmembers strive to achieve the right balance between the competing interests of these
stakeholders (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001) and that their accountability is seen through environmental and social infor-
mation reporting, (Healey, 2003; Perrini& Tencati, 2006; Solomon, 2010) as an extension of their ﬁduciary duties. Indeed, the
existing literature is unequivocal in its stand that company directors have ﬁduciary duties to stakeholders and the envi-
ronment (Haniffa& Cooke, 2005; Kolk, 2008; Milnes, 2009). Therefore, wheremanagers are seen to have inclinations towards
priorities other than or at the expense of environmental initiatives, board members may intervene to help align the interests
of managers with those of the stakeholders. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) argued that when managers have misguided
priorities for reasons known only to them, inquisitive directors can question such motives and help to align managerial
initiatives with shareholder expectations. Therefore, in developing the hypotheses, we discuss how various characteristics
help a board to meet its responsibilities, particularly relating to GHG voluntary reporting. De Villiers et al. (2011) argued that
depending on how a board is structured, it can perform two functions: monitoring and resource provision.
The literature has identiﬁed a number of corporate governance characteristics that help a ﬁrm perform these functions
relating to voluntary disclosures. These include board composition and size, the presence of non-executive directors (NEDs),
CEO duality, audit committee, and audit ﬁrm. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) found the presence of NEDs
on the board to be crucial in preventing management fraud, and thereby protecting shareholder interests. The board of di-
rectors is also meant to champion transparency and accountability, which is essential in disclosures (Collier & Zaman, 2005).
2.2. Prior studies
Empirical evidence suggests that every time a reporting regulation/set of guidance or signiﬁcant milestone related to the
environment and climate change is reached, companies reﬂect their reaction through disclosure. For instance, Freedman and
Jaggi (2010) documented evidence that ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto protocol in 2005 made companies whose jurisdiction had
ratiﬁed the protocol increase their level of GHG emission disclosure. Similarly, Rankin et al. (2011) found that the presence
and adoption of ISO 14001-certiﬁed environmental management systems had a signiﬁcant impact on the extent and quality of
GHG disclosures by Australian companies. The guidelines proposed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants had a
similar inﬂuence on the disclosure pattern of Canadian companies, as reported by Berthelot and Robert (2012). In other
disclosure studies, similar evidence has been documented (see Canace, Caylor, Johnson, & Lopez, 2010; Heﬂin, Kross, & Suk,
2012).
Studies of GHG disclosures particularly focussing on corporate governance characteristics have included that by Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), who investigated the role of the board of directors in divulging relevant GHG informa-
tion in a sample of FTSE Global 500 companies that participated in the CDP 2008 survey. The disclosure index was developed
from the Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index. Their results partly indicated that although ﬁrms are under public pressure to
disclose GHG information, the board of directors sometimes discourages these disclosures if there is a high probability of
litigation, especially when the costs of disclosure outweigh the beneﬁts. Their results also suggested that while the business
environment has changed over time with the inﬂuence of other stakeholders increasing, as far as climate change-related in-
formation is concerned, the board has continued to maintain the tradition of prioritising shareholder interests.
In another study focussing on which attributes of corporate governance inﬂuence a ﬁrm to make GHG disclosures, Peters
and Romi (2012) examined the determinants of GHG voluntary reporting in a sample of ﬁrms participating in the CDP from
2002 to 2006 and found evidence that GHG disclosures were positively related to what they called ‘sustainability oriented
corporate governance mechanisms’, notably the presence of a board-level environmental committee and of a management-
level post of corporate sustainability ofﬁcer. The size of the board and expertise of its members and the sustainability ofﬁcer
were dominant characteristics of those ﬁrms that disclosed more GHG information. Knowledge synergies between the
environmental committee and the audit committee were also found to be a signiﬁcant element in increasing the likelihood of
voluntary GHG disclosures.
Galbreath (2010) investigated howwell governance structures by both US and non-US ﬁrms had enabled ﬁrms to respond
to the challenge of climate change, using 98 ﬁrms in three industries across ten countries. Overall, the study found that the
ﬁrms were underperforming in their governance responses towards climate change but noted that non-US ﬁrms had a better
governance score than their US counterparts, using the Ceres scoring methodology. In addition, board characteristics such as
board size and diversity (including female representation) had no statistical link to climate change disclosures, while di-
rectors' age had some inﬂuence, with younger directors exerting positive inﬂuence. A recent study by Liao et al. (2014) found
that gender diversity, together with board independence and the existence of a board-level environmental committee, in-
ﬂuences the extent to which a ﬁrm is transparent in its ecological actions. Other studies have generally focused on the
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Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Stanny, 2011; Stanny & Ely, 2008).52.3. Research hypotheses
2.3.1. DEFRA guidance
The rationale for expecting DEFRA's (2009) guidance to signiﬁcantly affect GHG disclosure is that companies would be
keen to demonstrate their green efforts before further government intervention through enforceable regulation (see Watts &
Zimmerman, 1986). Besides, according to stakeholder-agency theory, external mechanisms (such as reporting guidance) may
help to align managerial and shareholder interests. Patten (1992) and Deegan et al. (2000) also documented evidence of ﬁrms
increasing their level of voluntary environmental disclosure in response to increased public pressure or a particular event.
Llena et al. (2007) stated that every time there was a signiﬁcant milestone related to the environment and GHGse such as the
Kyoto Protocol or European Commission recommendation on measuring and reporting environmental information in annual
reports e interest in this activity increased among European Union-based ﬁrms. Inchausti (1997) found that in Spain,
legislation (even before it came into full effect) had a strong bearing on the voluntary accounting disclosures made by
companies. Rankin et al. (2011) attributed the increase in GHG disclosure by Australian ﬁrms over time to public and policy
pressure, and noted the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of ISO 14001 on the extent and quality of environmental reporting; and Gordon,
Loeb, and Zhu (2012) found that the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 positively affected voluntary disclosure of
ﬁrms' security activities. We would therefore expect GHG disclosures in the UK to have increased over the years, but in
particular after DEFRA's guidance was issued in 2009. Hence, we hypothesise:
H1 There is a positive relationship between the publication of DEFRA's guidance and GHG disclosure, ceteris paribus.2.3.2. Corporate governance
2.3.2.1. Board size. According to stakeholder-agency theory, the board is vital tomonitoringmanagerial actions, with a view to
aligning these with stakeholder interests (Hill & Jones, 1992; Walsh & Seward, 1990). However, the appropriate board size to
discharge these duties satisfactorily is unclear, although the growing consensus is that a large board is likely to be beneﬁcial in
providing resources, particularly counsel and advice (De Villiers et al., 2011). Large boards have a diverse range of experience
and skills that may enable them to discharge their duties more effectively (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). This
diversity means that different board members may represent different interests, including those regarding environmental
and GHG issues. Moreover, Booth and Deli (1996) argued that the uncertainty relating to environmental issues generally leads
to large board sizes in order to allow ﬁrms' access to the expertise necessary to overcome this uncertainty. In addition, De
Villiers et al. (2011, p. 1645) stated that larger boards give wider connections with important stakeholders, so that ﬁrms
with large boards are ‘likely to facilitate access to critical ﬁnancial resources, allowing such boards more ﬁnancial leeway to
pursue environmental initiatives’.
Peters and Romi (2012) found evidence of a signiﬁcant positive relationship between board size and GHG disclosure. Other
disclosure studies that found a positive association include those by Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan, and Aerts (2011) for envi-
ronmental disclosure in general; Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) for intellectual capital; Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, and
Yao (2009) for voluntary disclosure in Malaysia; and Allegrini and Greco (2013) for voluntary disclosure by Italian listed
companies. Considering the theoretical and empirical evidence, we hypothesise:
H2 There is a positive relationship between board size and GHG disclosure, ceteris paribus.2.3.2.2. Non-executive directors. Board members are ultimately tasked to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO
and executive management (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to provision B1.2 of the UK Combined
Code 2012, companies in the UK are encouraged to have more NEDS than executive directors on their boards as a way of
enhancing board independence and improving board efﬁciency. This monitoring extends beyond ﬁnancial issues and also
covers a diverse range of areas such as environmental and climate change, since these also have grown in strategic5 Notwithstanding a few studies discussed above, it is recognised that empirical research on climate change accounting, of which this study is part, is a
growing ﬁeld; notable contributions and progress have been made in this respect. The Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal special issue on climate
change accounting research, published in 2011, comprised papers from interdisciplinary perspectives but all related to climate change; this was a testimony
of climate change accounting research coming of age. In this edition, Milne and Grubnic (2011) provided a useful summary of this ﬁeld, and the need for
further research has been emphasised. Besides, a recent review by Ascui (2014), in which articles published in at least ﬁve of the top journals on envi-
ronmental accounting from 2008 were reviewed, showed that a total of 89 articles had been published, 15 of which had exclusively focused on carbon
disclosures. For a useful summary of various avenues for research in this area, see Milne and Grubnic (2011). Another useful review of literature is provided
by Stechemesser and Guenther (2012).
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important because executive management is always faced with a conﬂict of interest when making decisions on matters with
beneﬁts that will outlive the managers' contracts. Thus, CEOs may not be motivated to invest in environmental or climate
change systemswith unclear short-term beneﬁts. On the other hand, prior studies (Kock et al., 2012; Prado-Lorenzo& Garcia-
Sanchez, 2010) have argued that an independent board, mostlymade up of NEDs, is capable of resistingmanagement pressure
to sideline these environmentally friendly initiatives. The role of independent directors in inﬂuencing management imple-
mentation of decisions such as those relating to ﬁnancial disclosure is well documented in the literature (Mangena &
Tauringana, 2007). More important to our setting, the role of NEDS in inﬂuencing environmental and climate change dis-
closures has also been documented (Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011). It is believed that the need to protect their own repu-
tation andmanage relationships with other environmentally sensitive stakeholdersmay give NEDs the incentive to champion
the need for climate change disclosures. It could also be the case that NEDs do not feel the pressure of competitors to the same
extent as executive managers (Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). In view of this, we hypothesise:
H3 There is a positive relationship between the proportion of NEDs on the board and GHG disclosure, ceteris paribus.2.3.2.3. Director share ownership. According to Kock et al. (2012), the divergence of interests regarding climate change issues
between directors and shareholders may occur due to information asymmetry. Director share ownership therefore helps to
align the interests of directors and shareholders (Dalton et al., 1999; De Villiers et al., 2011). Directors who own shares have a
strong inﬂuence on the type of information communicated to outsiders, because they are fully aware that the latter use this to
judge their performance. Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel (2011) explained that director ownership e especially where
executive directors have a signiﬁcant stakeemotivates them to act in the interests of a broader constituency of stakeholders.
When interests are aligned, consensus might easily be reached on environment-related projects with potential long-term
beneﬁts (De Villiers et al., 2011; Hansen & Hill, 1991). In addition, it is reported that director ownership improves board
monitoring of strategic decisions, including about environmental and climate change issues (Westphal, 1999). Johnson and
Greening (1999) argued that increased managerial ownership increases the probability of managers being sympathetic to
social and environmental activities, as they deem them potentially able to create goodwill, thus inducing customers to be
more favourably disposed to their companies' products, which will in turn improve the companies' standings with other
stakeholders such as bankers, government, and investors.
In contrast, some argue that increased director ownership may lead to aberrant decision-making by executive directors
(e.g. Dunn, 2004). Mohd Ghazali (2007) argued that when substantial investment is expected or required to be made in
systems to enable a ﬁrm to discharge social and environmental responsibilities, and there is uncertainty as to the payback
possibility of such investment, managers with high share ownershipmay resist voluntary activities, including disclosures. The
studies of Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Ahmed Haji (2013) found director share ownership to be negatively
associated with disclosure. Therefore, considering the litigious nature of GHG emission, which may make stakeholder re-
action to disclosure unpredictable, we argue that director ownership may lead to a cautious approach to disclosure, thereby
bringing about low disclosures. We therefore hypothesise:
H4 There is a negative relationship between director share ownership and GHG disclosure, ceteris paribus.2.3.2.4. Ownership concentration. Separation of ownership and control often leads to information asymmetries that, if un-
checked, are exploited by managers for their own beneﬁt, at the expense of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus,
ownership structure is considered part of the governance that helps monitor managerial behaviour. Nonetheless, monitoring
becomes difﬁcult when ownership is dispersed, due to the ‘free rider’ problem, with managers taking advantage of their
freedom and beneﬁting themselves at the expense of others. It is argued that block holding (or high concentration of
ownership) means stakes are high should managers make a mistake or act irrationally; the owners are therefore expected to
have resources for (and a special interest in) monitoringmanagement behaviour (Noe, 2002; Shleifer& Vishny,1986). Shleifer
and Vishny (1986) argued that large blockholders (oftenwith a signiﬁcant resource base) aremore likely to absorbmonitoring
costs than are individual shareholders. Besides, as agency theory suggests, monitoring has costs that may eventually be
passed onto managers through contractual arrangements. Hence, with high ownership concentration, managers may have
incentives to disclose more as a way of minimising the information asymmetry and the subsequent monitoring costs.66 Others have warned that where blockholders have aligned themselves with managers (and so are privy to the information available to them), they
might have less incentive to push for more disclosure (Bushman & Smith, 2001). Thus, blockholders' alignment with managers undermines the former's
monitoring responsibility and often results in a conﬂict of interests with other groups, such as minority shareholders. In this respect, high ownership
concentration is considered detrimental to voluntary disclosure (see Chau & Gray, 2002; Matolcsy, Shan, & Seethamraju, 2012). Berthelot and Robert (2012)
found a positive relationship between widely held ownership and voluntary disclosure of climate change information by Canadian oil and gas companies.
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) found that UK ﬁrms with high ownership concentration disclosed less environmental information, both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
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concentration to play a crucial role in forcing managers to disclose more information on GHG emissions as a way of safe-
guarding their investments. The fact that institutional investors have collaborated through initiatives that provide a platform
for ﬁrms to disclose their GHG information (such as the CDP) means their presence within an organisation may inﬂuence
managers to lead by example and so make more GHG disclosures. We therefore hypothesise that:
H5 There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and GHG disclosure, ceteris paribus.
2.3.3. Control variables
We control for a number of underlying company-speciﬁc characteristics that could inﬂuence the extent of GHG disclosure.
First, company size is a proxy for a number of things, such as public visibility: large companies tend to attract the attention of
diverse stakeholders, who use intense pressure and scrutiny to force them to engage in other social and environmental
activities as a way of maintaining their legitimacy within their operating environment (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Stanny &
Ely, 2008). The majority of studies have found a signiﬁcant positive relationship between company size and GHG disclosure
(e.g. Berthelot & Robert, 2012; Chithambo, 2013; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Peters & Romi, 2012;
Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011; Stanny, 2011). Our measure of company size is the natural log of total sales.
Second, we control for gearing (measured as a ratio of total debt to total shareholders' equity), considered a measure of risk
exposed by both equity holders and debt holders. In essence, creditors are worried that if a highly geared company is not
properly monitored, there might be wealth transfer from them to shareholders. In this case, if not provided with adequate
information, creditors ﬁnd their own means of monitoring management behaviour.
Third, our study controls for ﬁrm proﬁtability (measured by return on assets), because theoretical and empirical evidence
suggests that proﬁtability is an indicator of a ﬁrm's efﬁciency in resource allocation, meaningmanagers could bemotivated to
provide more information about their proﬁtability and other areas of stakeholder interest as a way of attracting more capital
than the less proﬁtable ﬁrms (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). Fourth, we control for liquidity (current assets divided by current
liabilities), because Cooke (1989) argued that highly liquid companies are likely to disclose more information in order to set
themselves apart from ﬁrms struggling with liquidity, and hence to attract favourable business-transaction terms. Other
controls include ﬁnancial slack, capital expenditure (capex), and ﬁrm age.We introduce ﬁnancial slack (measured as cash and
cash equivalents, divided by total sales). Firms with ﬁnancial slack are expected to channel resources into environmental or
climate change initiatives, including disclosure (Kock et al., 2012).
In line with other prior studies, such as De Villiers et al. (2011), we also control for the status of a ﬁrm's capital equipment
in property, plant, and equipment e since those with newer equipment are considered to have the capacity to manage their
emissions better than those with older equipment. This is represented by dividing total capital expenditure by total sales
(capex) (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011a). In addition, ﬁrm age is also considered to be a factor that could affect the extent of
GHG disclosure. Older ﬁrms are deemed well enough established to have resources to manage climate change issues, in
contrast to younger ones, which might have other pressing issues. Firm age is measured as the natural log of the number of
years a ﬁrm has been publicly listed on the London Stock Exchange. Finally, following de Villiers et al. (2011) and Liao et al.
(2014) we also controlled for industry.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection
In order to test the hypotheses andmeet the research objectives, our target population comprised companies listed on theUK
FTSE 350 from 2008 to 2011. The FTSE 350 was chosen because it is broad enough to cover a wide range of industries and it
comprises big companies that may set the pace on GHG reporting. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) suggested that the use of large
companies in a diverse range of industries permits a comprehensive review of disclosure and reasonable generalisability of re-
sults. The period 2008e2011was chosen because it covers two years before and after the publication of DEFRA's 2009 guidance.
Financial-sector ﬁrms (including banks, insurance companies, investment trusts, unit trusts and real-estate companies) e
of which there were 93 e were excluded from the sample because they are subject to different disclosure and statutory
requirements that may affect their accounting policies, disclosure decisions and corporate governance structures (Mangena&
Tauringana, 2007). Also excluded (to ensure comparability of the results) were ﬁrms with unpublished annual reports and/or
data missing from DataStream and elsewhere (e.g. as a result of deletions following mergers and acquisitions). Finally,
companies were excluded if there were not listed for the entire period of study or were subsidiaries of others already rep-
resented in the sample. This left a total sample of 215.3.2. GHG disclosure measure
To quantify GHG disclosure, we developed an index of disclosure comprising 60 items of information based on the re-
quirements of several GHG reporting framework. The validity and suitability of the research index e which is broader and
more comprehensive than those used in previous studies, e.g. Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) had a checklist of only 19 items e
Table 1
Variable measurement description.
Symbol Full name Measurement
Yit GHG disclosure index Disclosure score expressed as a ratio of the total possible score, i.e. 60
xdefra DEFRA Dummy variable coded 1 for 2010 and 2011, or 0 for 2008 and 2009
xbs Board size Number of people making up the board of a company
xned NEDs Ratio of NEDs on the board
xdo Director or insider ownership Proportion of shares held by directors
xow Ownership concentration Proportion of ownership by shareholders with 3% or more
xs Company size Total assets expressed as natural log
xgea Gearing Ratio between total debt and total shareholders' equity
xroa Proﬁtablity Proﬁt after tax, divided by total assets
xliq Liquidity Current assets, divided by current liabilities
xfage Firm age Firm age expressed as a natural log of the period the company has been listed
on the London Stock Exchange
xfslack Financial slack Measured as cash and cash equivalents, divided by total sales
xcapex Capital expenditure Total capital, divided by total sales
xind Industry Dummy variable coded 1 if in environmentally sensitive industry, otherwise 0
V. Tauringana, L. Chithambo / The British Accounting Review 47 (2015) 425e444 433was reviewed and conﬁrmed by two independent academics experienced in disclosure index-based studies. We then
employed a content-analysis technique (widely used in disclosure studies e Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994; Mangena &
Tauringana, 2007) to quantify GHG disclosure from companies' annual reports and stand-alone environmental/sustainabil-
ity reports. The literature suggests that disclosure can be quantiﬁed on either aweighted or an unweighted basis; Gray, Kouhy,
and Lavers (1995) claimed that the choice does not materially alter the results. Freedman and Jaggi (2005), while using a
weighted disclosure index, also used an estimated score of disclosed information based on the authors' perception of the
contributions of the information items to the evaluation of a ﬁrm's global warming performance. Meanwhile, Prado-Lorenzo
et al. (2009) used a binary variable (1 or 0, depending onwhether the itemwas disclosed or not), arguing that subjectivity was
otherwise amajor challenge and that their study (which also considered internet reports andwebsite information) was better
suited to this approach. An unweighted approach was considered more appropriate for this study, in which no greater
importance is given to any speciﬁc user groups (Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 1994) or items of disclosure.
A company was awarded a score of 1 if an itemwas disclosed, and 0 if not, but was not penalised if the item did not apply.
The total disclosure index score was then captured for each sample company as a ratio of the total disclosure score, divided by
the maximum possible disclosure for the company, and was ﬁnally expressed as a percentage.
3.3. Econometric modelling
Due to the panel time-series nature of the data, the study employed a ﬁxed effects modelling technique, to help capture
variation across different agents in space, and changes over time (Baltagi, 1995; Inchausti, 1997). More importantly, this
technique enables the researcher to take into account omitted or unobserved variables, and to control unobserved hetero-
geneity among companies. The static model of panel data is as follows:
Yit ¼ ai þ x0itbþ mit
(Yit is the endogenous variable (GHG disclosure index); xit are all the exogenous variables; b is a set of vector parameters; and
mit is a random variable.)
From the basic panel ﬁxed model, a number of estimations can be derived. One that resembles an Ordinary Least Squares
dummy variable model is a two-way ﬁxed effects model, estimated as follows:
Yit ¼ ai þ gt þ x0itbþ mit
(gt represents the (ﬁxed) time effects.)
This model gives both the group-speciﬁc dummies and time dummies. In our sample, in order to proceed to the speciﬁc
time effects, all the variables were included, with the exception of ‘DEFRA’ (i.e. whether before or after DEFRA's 2009
guidance, scoring 0 for 2008 and 2009, and 1 for 2010 or 2011). When the variable ‘DEFRA’ was included with the years,
there was a great degree of multicollinearity, and hence it was decided to drop it. Removing one original variable from the
subsequent set of stepwise or other regressions does not affect the ﬁnal outcome when the two models are compared for
ﬁtness. The ﬁnal models were therefore estimated as follows:
Yit ¼ ai þ bdefra$xdefrai þ bbs$xbsi þ bned$xnedi þ bdo$xdoi þ bow$xowi þ bs$xsi þ bgea$xgeai þ broa$xroai þ bliq$x
liq
i
þ bfage$xfagei þ bfslack$xfslacki þ bcapex$x
capex
i þ bind$xindi þ mi……>Model 1
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liq
it þ bfage$x
fage
i
þ bfslack$xfslacki þ bcapex$xcapexi þ bind$xindit þ S4at þ mit……>Model 2
t ¼ 1
where: i is 1,……215, t is 1 (2008), 2 (2009), 3 (2010), 4 (2011), and at are intercept variables that change from year to year.
They capture the difference between years, assuming the individual sample members are homogeneous. All other variables
are deﬁned in Table 1 below:
We use the Times 1000 industry categorisation, based on environmental risks. Also adopted by Thompson (1998), this
groups industries into two (perceived as having a high environmental risk or not).
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics e dependent variable
The trend descriptive statistics for the extent of GHG disclosure from 2008 to 2011 are presented in Table 2. These show
that the mean disclosure for 2008 is 25%, with a minimum of 0% and maximum of 78%, indicating wide variation in the
amount of GHG that companies disclose. Disclosures increased to 31% in 2009, presumably because companies took the CCA
(2008) as a signal of the government's intention to make GHG disclosure compulsory. GHG disclosure increased signiﬁcantly
between 2009 and 2010, from a mean of 31% to one of 35%.
The descriptive statistics for 2010 show a minimum disclosure of 2% and a maximum of 88%. It is possible that some of the
increase in disclosure in 2010 may be attributable to the fact that DEFRA published its guidance in 2009; this suggestion is
supported by the fact that in 2010 about 19.5% of the companies sampled disclosed the use of this guidance in compiling and
reporting their information. Although the trend in GHG disclosure continued upwards, the increase in mean GHG disclosure
between 2010 and 2011 (from 35% to 39%) was lower than between 2009 and 2010 (from 31% to 35%). An equally signiﬁcant
increase in GHG disclosure between 2008 and 2009e from amean of 25% to one of 31%e could be due to the effect of the CCA
(2008) in signalling the intention to publish guidance on GHG disclosure. This is consistent with Ascui and Lovell (2011), who
note that although convergence of a diverse range of stakeholder pressures (e.g. from government, non-governmental or-
ganisations, and professionals) has inﬂuenced change towards corporate behaviour favouring climate change, anticipation of
future regulation is in itself a dominant driver.
The small increase two years after introduction could be explained in terms of some ﬁrms catching up with reporting
trends. Based on the pooled data (2008e2011), the results indicate that companies' GHG scores ranged from 0 to 88%, but that
overall the mean disclosure for the four years is 32%, an indication that the extent of GHG disclosures by FTSE 350 companies
is still low.
Further insight into the disclosures is provided in Table 3. A review of the disclosures indicates that overall, more qual-
itative than quantitative disclosures weremade. For instance, in 2008, the ﬁrms disclosed about 31% of all available qualitative
disclosures against just 17% of the available quantitative disclosures (see Table 3, Panel B). However, over the whole period
studied, ﬁrms progressively increased their level of quantitative disclosures, reporting about 30% of the items in 2011,
compared with 17% in 2008. On the qualitative disclosures, most frequently reported were the actions/measures taken to
reduce/mitigate climate change impact, with almost 96% of the ﬁrms reporting these in 2011 (see Table 3, Panel A, Item 9).
This could suggest desire on the part of the companies to shift the focus of their target audience from actual to intended
impact on climate change. The least disclosed qualitative information in all the years was the disclosure of supplier and the
name of the green tariff purchased, with 4% of the ﬁrms disclosing this information in 2008 and 6% by 2011 (see Table 3, Panel
A, Item 25).
The number of ﬁrms disclosing their reporting framework guidelines has also increased from 39% in 2008 to 63% in 2011
(see Table 3, Panel A, Item 12). Over the same period, there has been a marginal increase in the number of ﬁrms obtaining
assurance services on their GHG emissions reporting e from 16% in 2008, to 27% in 2011 (see Table 3, Panel A, Item 13). This
could imply unwillingness on the part of the companies to dedicate resources to improving the quality of their GHG reporting.
As argued by Hrasky (2012), companies have now resorted to mere symbolism in terms of carbon disclosure, hence the needTable 2
GHG disclosure trend 2008e2011.
Year Mean Std dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
2008 0.25 0.20 0 0.78 0.94 2.99
2009 0.31 0.22 0 0.85 0.74 2.44
2010 0.35 0.21 0.02 0.88 0.60 2.24
2011 0.39 0.23 0 0.88 0.40 2.09
2008e2011 0.32 0.22 0 0.88 0.66 2.37
Table 3
Panel A: Consolidated disclosure scores for all industries. Panel B: Summary GHG disclosure scores.
Panel A
Disclosure item 2008 2009 2010 2011
Absolute
freq.
Relative (%) Absolute
freq.
Relative (%) Absolute
freq.
Relative (%) Absolute
freq.
Relative (%)
Qualitative disclosures
1 Institutional background 206 95% 213 99% 213 99% 213 99%
2 Period covered by the report 203 94% 212 98% 212 98% 212 98%
3 Statement on company position on
climate change and related
responsibilities
190 88% 200 93% 203 94% 202 94%
4 Corporate governance on climate
change
165 76% 182 84% 187 87% 191 88%
5 Climate change opportunities and
company strategies
110 51% 126 58% 138 64% 137 63%
6 Climate change impact on business
operations, including supply chains
80 37% 95 44% 105 49% 111 51%
7 Identiﬁcation of regulatory risks as a
result of climate change
40 19% 53 25% 61 28% 67 31%
8 Identiﬁcation of all other risks as a
result of climate change
54 25% 64 30% 78 36% 92 43%
9 Actions/measures taken to
reduce/mitigate climate change impact
183 85% 203 94% 206 95% 207 96%
10 Adaptation strategies to climate change
effects
77 36% 96 44% 101 47% 103 48%
11 Regulated schemes to which a ﬁrm
belongs
31 14% 58 27% 73 34% 79 37%
12 Reporting guidelines used in GHG
reporting
84 39% 112 52% 132 61% 135 63%
13 An assurance statement on disclosed
information
35 16% 45 21% 53 25% 58 27%
14 Contact or responsible person for GHG
reporting
113 52% 138 64% 155 72% 163 75%
15 Organisation boundary and
consolidation approach
65 30% 77 36% 89 41% 98 45%
16 Base year 77 36% 92 43% 111 51% 126 58%
17 Explanation for a change in base year 40 19% 51 24% 59 27% 69 32%
18 GHGs covered, including those not
required by Kyoto protocol
44 20% 58 27% 62 29% 68 31%
19 Sources and sinks used/excluded 51 24% 64 30% 74 34% 88 41%
20 Conversion factors used/methodology
used to measure or calculate emissions
40 19% 58 27% 70 32% 83 38%
21 Explanation for any changes to
methodology or conversion factors
previously used
31 14% 43 20% 59 27% 64 30%
22 A list of facilities included in the
inventory for GHG emissions
16 7% 23 11% 29 13% 37 17%
23 Information on the quality of the
inventory, e.g. causes and magnitude of
uncertainties in estimates
2 1% 5 2% 9 4% 13 6%
24 Information on any GHG sequestration 18 8% 29 13% 37 17% 37 17%
25 Disclosure of the supplier and the name
of the purchased green tariff
8 4% 8 4% 11 5% 13 6%
26 Explanations for changes in
performance of total GHG emissions in
CO2 metric tonnes
100 46% 126 58% 141 65% 154 71%
27 Explanation of any country excluded, if
global total is reported
75 35% 93 43% 106 49% 111 51%
28 Explanations for changes in
performance of scope 1 emissions
35 16% 49 23% 60 28% 69 32%
29 Details of any speciﬁc exclusion of
emissions from scope 1
22 10% 34 16% 50 23% 55 25%
30 Explanation for the reason of any
exclusion from scope 1
18 8% 29 13% 40 19% 45 21%
31 Explanations for changes in
performance of scope 2 emissions
34 16% 48 22% 58 27% 65 30%
32 Details of any speciﬁc exclusion of
emissions from scope 2
22 10% 34 16% 49 23% 53 25%
33 Explanation for the reason of any
exclusion from scope 2
18 8% 29 13% 39 18% 44 20%
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued )
Panel A
Disclosure item 2008 2009 2010 2011
Absolute
freq.
Relative (%) Absolute
freq.
Relative (%) Absolute
freq.
Relative (%) Absolute
freq.
Relative (%)
34 Explanations for changes in
performance of scope 3 emissions
23 11% 35 16% 48 22% 59 27%
Quantitative disclosures
35 Total GHG emissions in CO2 metric
tonnes
117 54% 138 64% 154 71% 170 79%
36 Comparative data of total GHG
emissions in CO2 metric tonnes
103 48% 125 58% 142 66% 159 74%
37 Future estimates of total GHG emissions
in CO2 metric tonnes
10 5% 13 6% 13 6% 15 7%
38 GHG emission by business
unit/type/country
75 35% 90 42% 108 50% 123 57%
39 GHG removals quantiﬁed in tonnes of
CO2e
23 11% 29 13% 36 17% 43 20%
40 Scope 1 emissions 28 13% 41 19% 54 25% 63 29%
41 Comparative data on scope 1 emissions 20 9% 32 15% 47 22% 56 26%
42 Future estimates of scope 1 emissions 1 0% 2 1% 3 1% 3 1%
43 Scope 2 emissions 28 13% 40 19% 53 25% 62 29%
44 Comparative data on scope 2 emissions 20 9% 32 15% 46 21% 54 25%
45 Future estimates of scope 2 emissions 1 0% 2 1% 3 1% 5 2%
46 Scope 3 emissions 18 8% 29 13% 39 18% 50 23%
47 Comparative data on scope 3 emissions 14 6% 24 11% 36 17% 45 21%
48 Future estimates of scope 3 emissions 1 0% 2 1% 3 1% 3 1%
49 Emission of direct CO2 reported
separately from scopes
60 28% 68 31% 81 38% 95 44%
50 Emission not covered by Kyoto and
reported separately from scopes
57 26% 67 31% 83 38% 95 44%
51 Emission attributable to own
generation of electricity/heat/steam
sold or transferred to another organ.
81 38% 93 43% 103 48% 116 54%
52 Emission attributable to own
generation of electricity/heat/steam
purchased for resale to end users
36 17% 48 22% 54 25% 63 29%
53 For purchased green tariff, state the
reduction in tonnes of CO2e per year
7 3% 13 6% 16 7% 17 8%
54 Additional carbon saving associated
with the tariff as a percentage
2 1% 6 3% 6 3% 5 2%
55 Quantitative data estimates of the
regulatory risks as a result of climate
change
1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0%
56 Quantitative data estimates of all other
risks as a result of climate change
1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 2 1%
57 GHG emission performance
measurement against internal and
external benchmarks, including ratios
57 26% 79 37% 89 41% 105 49%
58 GHG emission targets set and achieved 82 38% 108 50% 122 56% 139 64%
59 GHG emission offsets information 26 12% 33 15% 39 18% 48 22%
60 Comparative information on targets set
and achieved
75 35% 99 46% 115 53% 133 62%
Panel B
Type of
disclosure
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008e2011
All ﬁrms
score
Max. poss.
scorea
% of
score
All ﬁrms
score
Max. poss.
scorea
% of
score
All ﬁrms
score
Max. poss.
scorea
% of
score
All ﬁrms
score
Max. poss.
scorea
% of
score
All ﬁrms
score
Max. poss.
scorea
% of
score
Qualitative
disclosures
2310 7344 31% 2782 7344 38% 3118 7344 42% 3321 7344 45% 11,531 29,376 39%
Quantitative
disclosures
944 5616 17% 1215 5616 22% 1447 5616 26% 1670 5616 30% 5276 22,464 23%
Total GHG
disclosure
score
3254 12,960 25% 3997 12,960 31% 4565 12,960 35% 4991 12,960 39% 16,807 51,840 32%
a Maximum possible score is derived by multiplying total number of ﬁrms and total disclosure items available per category.
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Table 4
Pooled descriptive statistics for independent variables.
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
DEFRA 0.5 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Board size (number) 9.19 2.62 4 31 1.43 8.79
NEDs (ratio) 0.65 0.11 0.29 0.93 0.26 2.75
Director ownership (%) 5.46 13.25 0 85.37 2.99 11.59
Ownership concent. (%) 40.23 17.80 3.55 91.47 0.17 2.47
Size (£million) 9594.02 31638.90 40.00 345257.00 7.06 60.74
Gearing (ratio) 1.52 12.52 0.02 246.24 15.45 255.25
Proﬁtability (%) 8.97 11.57 84.6 120.39 1.11 30.38
Liquidity (ratio) 1.62 1.70 0.19 27.28 7.46 90.27
Firm age (years) 23.62 20.62 0 80 0.86 2.50
Financial slack (ratio) 0.71 6.69 0 104.22 11.96 154.57
Capital expenditure (ratio) 0.21 0.98 0 17.65 11.16 155.19
V. Tauringana, L. Chithambo / The British Accounting Review 47 (2015) 425e444 437for government intervention to improve the quality of disclosures. Voluntary disclosure is also considered less reliable, as
managers tend to focus on areas that suit their needs rather than on genuine desire for accountability (Neu, Warsame, &
Pedwell, 1998); hence, there is consensus that reliability can be achieved only through regulation (Deegan, 2004).
The most frequently reported quantitative item in all the years under review was the total GHG emissions in CO2 metric
tonnes, reported by 79% of the ﬁrms in 2011 (see Table 3, Panel A, Item 35). However, over the same period, evidence indicates
low levels of GHG quantitative disclosure per scope. For example, only 13% of the ﬁrms reported their GHG emissions for
scope 1 in 2008; by 2011, the ﬁgure had risen to only 29% (see Table 3, Panel A, Item 40). A similar ﬁnding was recorded by
Dragomir (2012), who noted that a sample of companies including BP, Total, Shell, BG Group, and Eni had largely disclosed
GHG emissions in total rather than per scope.
There was a lack of quantitative information relating to future estimates of emissions and quantiﬁable estimates of reg-
ulatory risks arising from climate change, with just 1% of the ﬁrms disclosing this for all the years of 2008e2011 (see Table 3,
Panel A, Items 42, 45,& 48). This reﬂects the ﬁndings of Haque and Deegan (2010), who noted that Australian companies' GHG
emission disclosures had provided only limited insights into climate change risks and opportunities. This could, arguably,
imply failure on the part of the ﬁrms to fully integrate GHG reporting into the other parts of the business. Kolk et al. (2008)
reported that, in general, their sampled ﬁrms' GHG disclosures demonstrated no link among strategy, performance, and GHG
emissionsewhich meant there was a lack of GHG integration into mainstream business strategies. Stanny (2011) interpreted
the lack of effort by ﬁrms to improve the quality of disclosures as conﬁrmation of legitimacy theory, arguing that e in this
respect e ﬁrms disclose the minimum possible to meet stakeholders' needs. Alternatively, a lack of quantitative disclosures
may imply that ﬁrms use disclosure merely as a means of carbon performance story-telling, with such stories not corre-
sponding to reality on the ground (Bowen &Wittneben, 2011). Thus, increased qualitative disclosures might sometimes lead
to less transparency and accountability, as real actions/impacts (which can be identiﬁed through quantitative disclosures) are
hidden in long-winded and often well-crafted stories.4.2. Descriptive statistics e independent variables
The descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables in Table 4 indicate that the mean board size was about
nine directors, with aminimum of four andmaximum of 31. The companies had low levels of director ownership (as indicatedTable 5
Correlation among dependent and independent variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Disclosure 1.00
2. DEFRA 0.20*** 1.00
3. Board size 0.39*** 0.03 1.00
4. Non-executive direc. 0.16*** 0.08** 0.11** 1.00
5. Director ownership. 0.21*** 0.03 0.11** 0.11*** 1.00
6. Ownership concent. 0.28*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.02 0.21*** 1.00
7. Firm size 0.54*** 0.05 0.62*** 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.38*** 1.00
8. Gearing 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06* 0.02 1.00
9. Proﬁtability 0.02 0.12*** 0.04 0.07** 0.03 0.04 0.14*** 0.02 1.00
10. Liquidity 0.11*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.05 0.11** 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.02 1.00
11. Firm age 0.06* 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.02 0.04 1.00
12. Financial slack 0.10*** 0.00 0.06* 0.14*** 0.00 0.07** 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 1.00
13. Capital expenditure 0.06* 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.08** 0.06* 0.01 0.02 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.02 1.00
14. Industry 0.04 0 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.08** 0.04 0.21*** 1.00
* ** *** signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
V. Tauringana, L. Chithambo / The British Accounting Review 47 (2015) 425e444438by a mean of 5.46%) and moderate levels of ownership concentration (as suggested by the mean of 40.23% over the four-year
period). The size of ﬁrms (measured by total assets) had a wider range and great variability between years. For example, total
assets ranged from £40 million to £345,257 million, with a mean of £9594.02 million and standard deviation of £31,638.9
million. The majority of the ﬁrms sampled were highly geared (with a mean of 1.52).
There was great variability with regard to proﬁtability. For example, companies in the sample had a return on assets
ranging from 84.6% to 120.39%, with a standard deviation of 11.57. It is also noticeable that the company size, gearing,
proﬁtability, ﬁnancial slack, liquidity, and capital expenditure variables have high levels of kurtosis. However, Tabachnick and
Fidell (2007) argued that in large samples, the impact of skewdness and kurtosis values from normality is suppressed. In this
case, therefore, the effect of the non-normal distribution in the independent variables is unlikely to affect the ﬁnal outcome.
4.3. Correlation of dependent and independent variables
In Table 5, we present correlations among the dependent and independent variables. The results show that there are no
high correlations among all the independent variables except for between board size and company size, which had a sig-
niﬁcant positive correlation of 0.62. According to Field (2009), a correlation of independent variables of above 0.8 is a cause for
concern; hence, the correlation between board size and company size is considered to have less impact on the overall result.
However, according to Myers (1990), a certain degree of multicollinearity can still exist, even when none of the correlation
coefﬁcients is very large. Therefore, we also examine the variance inﬂation factors in our models to test further for
multicollinearity.
Furthermore, we carried out both the BreuschePagan/CookeWeisberg test for heteroscedasticity and White's test for
homoscedasticity; if heteroscedasticity were present but not controlled, the standard errors and any associated tests could be
false. In both cases, the test statistic was highly signiﬁcant, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. According to Berry
and Feldman (1985), heteroscedasticity can be controlled through various means, including variable transformation and the
use of robust standard errors. In this paper, both options have been used; some variables notably ﬁrm size were transformed
logarithmically, and again the option of robust was used in Stata 12 (the data analysis software we employed).
4.4. Multivariate results and discussion
The results are presented using two models in Table 6. What differentiates Model 1 from Model 2 is the characteristic of
our time variable. In Model 1, a dummy variable (‘DEFRA’) has been used to capture the time effect, while in Model 2 there are
four dummy variables representing time effect. Model 1 results indicate that ‘DEFRA’, corporate governance variables (board
size, director ownership, and ownership concentration) and company-speciﬁc control variables (size, gearing, ﬁnancial slack,
and industry) all have a signiﬁcant effect on GHG disclosure scores. All the coefﬁcients were statistically signiﬁcant at 0.01,
with the exception of board size and ownership concentration, which had signiﬁcance of 0.05. The corporate governance
variable (NEDs) and company-speciﬁc control variables (proﬁtability, liquidity, ﬁrm age, and capital expenditure) have no
signiﬁcant relationship with GHG disclosure. The model explains 32% of the variation in the extent of GHG disclosure.
The results of Model 2, which explain 33% of the variation in GHG disclosure, conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of the time dummy
variables (representing the effect of DEFRA's 2009 guidance). Analysis of the time effects showed that the change in GHGTable 6
Multivariate results.
GHG disclosure (DV) Model 1 Model 2
Coefﬁcienta Robust std. err. Coefﬁcienta Robust std. err.
DEFRA 0.08*** 0.01 e e
Board size 0.07** 0.04 0.08** 0.04
NEDs 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
Director ownership 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
Ownership concentration 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
Size 0.07*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01
Gearing 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
Proﬁtability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Liquidity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Firm age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Financial slack 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
Capital expenditure 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Industry 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01
Year 2009 e e 0.06*** 0.02
Year 2010 e e 0.09*** 0.02
Year 2011 e e 0.12*** 0.02
R-Squared 0.34 0.34
Adj. R-Squared 0.32 0.33
a Most coefﬁcients are 0.00 due to rounding off to two decimal places; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05.
V. Tauringana, L. Chithambo / The British Accounting Review 47 (2015) 425e444 439disclosure was most pronounced between 2009 and 2010, as indicated by the change in t-ratio. The results also indicate that
corporate governance variables (board size, director ownership, and ownership concentration) and company-speciﬁc control
variables (size, gearing, ﬁnancial slack, and industry) are signiﬁcant, as identiﬁed in Model 1. As a result, H1 is conﬁrmed, as
are H2, H4, and H5. The results in Model 2, which show the non-signiﬁcance of one corporate governance variable (NEDs),
mean that H3 is not conﬁrmed.
Our ﬁnding on the effect of the 2009 DEFRA guidance is consistent with prior studies, for example Freedman and Jaggi
(2005), whose investigation found that ﬁrms operating in Kyoto-ratifying countries made more disclosures than their
counterparts elsewhere. Similarly, Sidaway and De Lange (2011) found that the introduction of the National Greenhouse and
Energy Reporting Act in Australia had positively inﬂuenced ﬁrms not targeted by this, encouraging them to voluntarily
disclose climate change information. Besides, other research evidence indicates that companies tend to respond positively to
government guidance or proposals in anticipation of regulation (Inchausti, 1997; Llena et al., 2007).
From the evidence, it could be argued that ﬁrms appear to have embraced the 2009 DEFRA guidance as pseudo-regulatory
(i.e. indicating the direction of future policy and legislation), and so as useful to comply with. It could also suggest that this
guidance provided reasonable justiﬁcation for managers to invest in systems to collect and report GHG emissions. In fact, the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), an inﬂuential industry umbrella body in the UK, hailed the introduction of the 2009
DEFRA guidance as a step towards the mandatory reporting for which it had been calling, as a way of achieving consistency
and comparability of results (CBI, 2011). Evidence documented by De Villiers and Van Staden (2011b) also suggests that
investors have been very supportive of the move towards government regulation/guidance on GHG reporting.
The results relating to the effect of corporate governance are consistent with our hypotheses, apart from that relating to
NEDs. Our ﬁnding that board size is positive and signiﬁcant suggests that this is important to GHG disclosure, and is consistent
with prior studies (Cormier et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2012). Dalton et al. (1999) argued that larger boards tend to have
diverse skills and experience, allowing greater oversight (in this case on GHGs). The results, which indicate that both
ownership concentration and director ownership have a signiﬁcant negative association with GHG voluntary disclosure,
imply that directors and large shareholders have channels other than those investigated here to gather a ﬁrm's information
on GHG emissions. Other studies (e.g. Barker, 1998) found that most fund managers (who formed the core of institutional
investors and ownership concentration in the UK) considered meetings with senior managers to be their most important
source of information. In the case of GHG emissions, it could be argued that other avenues (such as CDP disclosure) are used or
encouraged by institutional investors; hence, they may not ﬁnd encouraging managers to disclose GHG information in other
media to be worthwhile.
On the other hand, the misﬁt of the variable ‘NEDs’ in the model suggests that the proportion of NEDs on the board has no
inﬂuence on GHG disclosure. As this variable often represents the level of independence relating to board decisions, it
suggests that whether the board is free from material inﬂuence by either owners or managers is of no consequence to GHG
disclosure. Seen in the light of stakeholder-agency theory, this is a contradiction because agency theory encourages high
numbers of NEDs on the board as a mechanism to keep managerial opportunism in check and to reduce agency costs.
However, the result is consistent with prior studies (Ho&Wong, 2001). This could be explained byMangena and Tauringana's
(2007) argument that NEDs might be preoccupied with other matters and so fail to pay proper attention to the equally
important matter of disclosure, or simply delegate it to a particular sub-committee. Others argue that NEDs may not per se be
independent in practice, due to other inﬂuences that may compromise their professional judgement (Buniamin, Alrazi, Johari,
& Rahman, 2008). One plausible explanation could be that these board structures are yet to reposition themselves to meet the
challenges of climate change. Kock et al. (2012) alluded to the fact that board characteristics such as those covered in our
study, being primarily designed for different sets of objectives, may not be useful in achieving environmental aims. Mallin,
Michelon, and Raggi (2013) argued that there is no straightforward path between corporate governance and social/envi-
ronmental disclosure, and so called for innovative techniques to prove the link. Arguably, the period covered by the study
coincided with the ﬁnancial crisis; hence, ﬁrms and their boards were preoccupied with repositioning themselves to respond
to the inadequacies exposed during the crisis, meaning that issues relating to GHGs might have had less prominence.
The results of the underlying company-speciﬁc control variables also indicate that company size is positively associated
with disclosure of more GHG information. This is consistent with prior studies on GHG disclosure, such as those by Freedman
and Jaggi (2005), Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), Rankin et al. (2011), Berthelot and Robert (2012), and Adams, Hill, and Roberts
(1998). The negative coefﬁcient in respect of gearing means that highly geared companies are likely to disclose less infor-
mation on GHG emissions. While the result contradicts the ﬁndings of prior studies on GHG disclosure (see Freedman& Jaggi,
2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009; Rankin et al., 2011), it is consistent with those of Brammer and Pavelin (2008). There was a
positive signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁnancial slack and GHG voluntary disclosures. Our ﬁnding on the industry variable
is interesting but ambiguous when compared to prior studies. The literature on climate change and GHG disclosure
(Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011) e though not in complete agreement on which
sectors are more prominent when it comes to disclosure e largely agrees that some industries deemed heavy polluters
disclose more information. Our results contradict this, instead ﬁnding evidence that those industries deemed less environ-
mentally risky disclose more information than their counterparts. We argue that this may reﬂect not only the sample's
characteristics and the instrument used to measure the extent of disclosure but also the nature of GHG emissions. Firms in
heavily polluting industries may feel that greater disclosure exposes themmore, and somay be unforthcomingwhen it comes
to transparency and accountability for their emissions (Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Wegener, Elayan, Felton,& Li,
V. Tauringana, L. Chithambo / The British Accounting Review 47 (2015) 425e4444402013). On the other hand, less environmentally risky industries may disclose more as a way of pre-empting potential
regulation that might be costly to comply with.4.5. Robustness check
A study such as this could be subject to a number of statistical limitations, including endogeneity, which occurs when a
model omits some variables of interest and so fails to provide a full picture. One solution is to include all known variables and
ﬁnd suitable instruments to measure (or proxies for) other factors. We did incorporate some known governance variables in
the regressionmodel that were not in our model but have been extensively used in prior disclosure studies. Our rationale was
that research into governance and environmental studies is extensive, and many aspects of governance have been tested
before that, if left out, could have meant our understanding was incomplete e and hence could have compounded the
problem of endogeneity (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The variables tested were size of the audit committee, presence of an
environmental committee, gender diversity (using proportion of female board members), directors' age, and frequency of
board meetings; all were non-signiﬁcant, and the explanatory power of our model did not surpass the 33% reported in our
model (with results available upon request). We also reviewed the possibility of including CEO duality in themodel. However,
based on our sample, this was deemed inadequate to generate meaningful statistical results, since there were only ﬁve ﬁrms
with CEO duality.
In addition, based on our literature review, we noted that the industry variable is categorised differently (e.g. Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009, had 11 categories; Rankin et al., 2011, had four; and Freedman & Jaggi, 2005, had ﬁve). We therefore
reclassiﬁed our industry variable based on the Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark, and this resulted in nine industry categories
(having excluded ﬁnance). We then ran the two models again, using the reclassiﬁed industry variable, but the results did not
materially differ from our models (in that neither the direction nor signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables changed). Results
are not included here but are available on request. After estimating models with all nine industry variables and with only one
industry variable, a log-likelihood ratio was run to determine the appropriate model. Our chi-square indicated that clustering
the industry variable into one dummy variable resulted in a statistically signiﬁcant model. The log-likelihood ratio had LR chi2
(8) of 28.70, with Prob > chi2 of 0.00. Based on these results, the models with results reported in Table 6 was deemed more
appropriate.5. Summary and conclusion
This paper investigated the effect of the 2009 DEFRA guidance on the extent of GHG disclosure and how corporate
governance characteristics moderate this. Based on the statistical evidence presented here, the guidance did indeed impact
on GHG voluntary disclosure, demonstrating how government intervention can help bring in line ﬁrms' behaviour on
voluntary disclosure. There is also evidence that the level of disclosure is moderated by corporate governance variables (board
size, directors' share ownership, and ownership concentration) and company-speciﬁc characteristics (size, leverage, ﬁnancial
slack, and industry). Our results are also consistent with prior studies on the effect of government regulation or guidance
(Canace et al., 2010; Heﬂin et al., 2012; Kalelkar & Nwaeze, 2011; Llena et al., 2007; Rankin et al., 2011; Sidaway & De Lange,
2011); in addition, although Mangena and Tauringana (2007) did not investigate the effect of DEFRA's guidance, they found
disclosure evidence consistent with response to policy or regulation in general. Our results also ﬁt with previous ﬁndings on
board size (Cormier et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2012), NEDs (Brammer and Pavelin (2008)), ownership concentration
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Matolcsy, Shan, & Seethamraju, 2012), and managerial ownership (Gelb, 2000).
The fact that a combination of DEFRA's guidance and corporate governance/company-speciﬁc control variables have been
found to inﬂuence GHG voluntary disclosure suggests that neither pseudo-regulatory guidelines (such as the guidance) nor
market forces (represented by the various corporate governance and company-speciﬁc characteristics) can satisfactorily
encourage a ﬁrm to disclose information to meet stakeholder needs. In other words, our results justify some form of inter-
vention if the extent of voluntary disclosure is to be improved. This is also supported by the ﬁndings of De Villiers and Van
Staden (2011b) who e after surveying shareholders from Australia, the UK, and the USA e concluded that, in all countries,
shareholders expressed a preference for mandatory environmental disclosure in annual reports. In fact, 50% of UK share-
holders supported a move towards prescribed regulation. Calls for regulation are bolstered by the fact that many consider
voluntary disclosure of information e such as that on GHG emissions e to be less reliable as managers tend to focus on areas
that suit their needs (Neu et al., 1998), and hence reliability can be achieved through regulation (Deegan, 2004). According to
Boston and Lempp (2011), regulation in this respect will not only reduce apathy in disclosure and reliability but will also
encourage ﬁrms to take real action on reducing emissions. This is probably why the UK government has made GHG disclosure
mandatory from 2013 for all London Stock Exchange-listed companies. It should, however, be noted that in the ﬁeld of climate
change e where a number of issues (such as its science and impact) are still not universally accepted, and ﬁrms are only
slowly buying into the idea of climate change being of strategic importance (Grifﬁn, Lont, & Sun, 2011; Grifﬁn & Sun, 2012;
Yen& Yen, 2012)e the stepwise introduction of regulationwas and remains an ideal way forward. Thus, the enactment of the
CCA (2008), subsequent consultation and the issuance of DEFRA's (2009) guidance, and then the timing of the release of
mandatory requirements for GHG disclosure in September 2013 meant that companies have been given ample time to gain
experience of disclosure through complying with guidelines before moving to a compulsory regime. Considering that various
V. Tauringana, L. Chithambo / The British Accounting Review 47 (2015) 425e444 441controversial policy and scientiﬁc issues surround climate change, we argue that this could be an appropriatemodel for future
regulation in this area.
The study has a number of limitations. First, the sample was extracted from FTSE 350 companies after excluding ﬁnancial
companies. Future research might extend the sample to include these companies and some medium/small companies, since
DEFRA's (2009) guidance can be used by any company regardless of the nature of its operations or its size. Second, our analysis
is restricted to disclosures made in annual reports and in sustainability reports, and no attempt has been made to compare
these with disclosures made through other avenues, such as the CDP. Therefore, future studies might compare these avenues
in order to learn useful lessons.
Despite these limitations, the study makes the following contributions to the disclosure literature. First, the study con-
tributes to the ongoing debate on the efﬁcacy of voluntary over mandatory disclosure, in particular highlighting whether
voluntary disclosure can be relied upon to provide adequate information to meet various stakeholder needs. Hess (2008)
argued that voluntary disclosure often indicates the extent to which mandatory guidelines may enforce compliance. This
is especially important given that the UK government has nowmade GHG reportingmandatory. Second, the study contributes
to the understanding of GHG voluntary disclosure practices by UK ﬁrms in the context of the requirements of a number of
GHG disclosure guidance. This contrasts with GHG disclosure indexes used bymost extant research (e.g. Peters& Romi, 2012;
Stanny, 2011), which tend to be based on only one set of GHG disclosure guidance. Third, the study provides evidence of the
effect of corporate governance and company-speciﬁc control variables on GHG disclosure in the UK, where there is limited
empirical evidence. Finally, our study's inclusion of companies from a diverse range of industries sets it apart from prior GHG
disclosure studies, which have tended to predominantly focus on the so-called ‘environmentally sensitive’ industries.
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